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ABSTRACT 
  The pharmaceutical industry relies on innovation. However, many 
innovative firms are cutting their research and development 
investments and seeing their new product pipelines dry up, due in part 
to a lack of sufficient patent protection. This Note identifies two major 
factors that have caused this inadequacy in patent protection. First, 
pharmaceutical patents are challenged early and often by generic 
manufacturers, as encouraged by the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act. 
Second, the scope of pharmaceutical-patents is sometimes unduly 
restrained due to limited application of the doctrine of equivalents. 
Consequently, pharmaceutical patents, especially drug-product 
patents, are easily designed around and cannot offer the protection 
necessary for innovative firms to recoup their developmental costs. 
  This Note argues for a wider application of means-plus-function 
clauses in pharmaceutical patents as a potential cure for this problem. 
Means-plus-function claims, although authorized by Congress in the 
1952 Patent Act, have not been explored much in the pharmaceutical 
context. This Note argues that this claiming strategy is not only 
appropriate but also particularly effective for pharmaceutical patents. 
Means-plus-function claims would give drug-product patents 
adequate scope even with the limited use of the doctrine of equivalents 
and thus would provide the protection necessary for innovative firms 
to withstand frequent attacks by generic manufacturers. Finally, this 
Note examines issues anticipated with applying means-plus-function 
claims to pharmaceutical patents and proposes possible solutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution endows Congress with the 
authority to grant inventors time-limited, exclusive rights “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”1 Pursuant to this 
authority, Congress established the patent system to give inventors 
temporary rights to exclude others from making, using, or selling their 
inventions or importing them into the United States.2 These exclusive 
rights allow inventors to profit from their ideas, thus providing strong 
financial incentives for innovation.3 
Traditionally, the patent system has been considered successful 
in promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.4 Currently, 
however, a number of branded pharmaceutical companies face the 
daunting reality of losing patent coverage on their most lucrative 
drugs, creating what is known as the “patent cliff” phenomenon.5 To 
be sure, the expiration of such drug patents and the subsequent 
market entry of generic versions of branded drugs means significant 
savings for consumers.6 This phenomenon, however, also raises 
concern for the future of new drug development. In the past few 
years, loss of patent protection has caused sales revenue for 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, §§ 3(j), 20(j)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 290, 335 (2011). 
 3. Kelly A. Gidcumb, Rethinking the Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Both Sides of the 
Equation, 6 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23, 26 (2006). 
 4. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug 
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 613 (2011) (“The pharmaceutical industry is the 
rare setting in which the patent system works as it is supposed to—or so the story goes.”); 
Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J.H. Graham, Balancing Innovation and Access: Patent Challenges 
Tip the Scales, 326 SCIENCE 370, 370 (2009) (“[T]here is little debate that [patents] are 
important for spurring drug innovation.”). 
 5. See Katie Reid, Update 4—Novartis To Cut 2,000 Jobs To Save Annual $200 Mln, 
REUTERS, Oct. 25, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/25/novartis-
idUSL5E7LP10G20111025 (“Global drugmakers have cut tens of thousands of jobs ahead of 
patent expirations on their top-selling products . . . .”); Duff Wilson, Patent Woes Threatening 
Drug Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A1 (“This year alone, because of patent expirations, 
the drug industry will lose control over more than 10 megamedicines whose combined annual 
sales have neared $50 billion.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Ranit Mishori, Why Are Generic Drugs Cheaper Than Brand-Name Ones?, 
WASH. POST (July 11, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-11/national/
35267296_1_generic-drugs-manufacturers-of-brand-name-drugs-pharmaceutical-companies 
(“Generic makers don’t face the same costs as manufacturers of brand-name drugs. . . . [T]he 
brand-name maker often invented the drug, a process that can cost hundreds of millions of 
dollars. . . . [The brand-name maker’s] investment also includes advertising . . . . For a generic 
manufacturer, no such investment is required—not in development and not in marketing.”). 
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innovative firms to plummet, compelling them to restructure to 
survive financially.7 As a part of this restructuring, many firms have 
heavily cut their investments in research and development (R&D) for 
new products.8 
Widespread reduction in R&D investment is particularly 
alarming because the pharmaceutical industry is very research 
intensive and heavily depends on product innovation.9 Over the years, 
developing a new drug has become increasingly expensive, time-
consuming, and risky.10 On average, developing a new medicine and 
securing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval requires 
screening between five and ten thousand compounds.11 This process 
takes on average ten to fifteen years and costs $1.3 billion.12 Indeed, 
with shrinking R&D investment and increasingly costly drug 
development, a number of branded pharmaceutical firms have 
experienced a drying up of their new-product pipelines in the past 
 
 7. See, e.g., Drugmaker AstraZeneca To Cut 1,150 U.S. Employees, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 
2011), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/story/2011-12-07/Astra-zeneca-
layoffs/ 51708132/1 (“Drugmaker AstraZeneca will cut roughly 24% of its U.S. sales force in an 
effort to curb costs, part of a company-wide restructuring announced in 2010.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Daniel Cressey, Pfizer Slashes R&D, 470 NATURE 154, 154 (2011) (“With key 
patents about to expire, Pfizer, the world’s largest pharmaceutical company in terms of sales, 
unveiled plans to slash its research and development (R&D) spending by billions and cut 
thousands of jobs.”); Sten Stovall, R&D Cuts Curb Brain-Drug Pipeline, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704474804576222463927753954.html 
(“Many companies . . . have recently scaled back their research into how the brain works and 
affects behavior.”); Lori Valigra, Biotech Companies Cut R&D Spending, Maintain Cash 
Reserves, BDO Study Says, MASS HIGH TECH (July 29, 2011, 2:19 PM EDT), 
http://www.masshightech.com/stories/2011/07/25/daily54-Biotech-companies-cut-RD-spending-
maintain-cash-reserves-BDO-study-says.html (“R&D efforts may be a mission critical activity 
for biotech companies, but a new report says public biotechs have cut spending for the second 
straight year . . . .”). 
 9. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2589, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 9 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (stating that the percentage of total sales 
revenue that is invested in R&D at an average pharmaceutical company is five times higher 
than that at the average manufacturing firm). 
 10. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2011 PROFILE 10 
(2011), available at http://catalyst.phrma.org/wp-content/uploads/fromPhrma/phrma_profile
_ 2011_final.pdf. The major factors behind the increase in the time and cost of new drug 
development include (1) heightened regulatory requirements regarding trial size and length; and 
(2) the increased cost of animal testing and conducting clinical trials. Michael Dickson & Jean 
Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, 3 
NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 417, 420, 426 (2004). 
 11. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 10, at 12 fig.4. 
 12. Id. at 10. 
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decade,13 indicating an industry-wide decrease in innovative activities. 
Because the development of new health-improving or even life-saving 
drugs relies on pharmaceutical innovation, the potential social loss is 
difficult to estimate. 
Many factors both within and outside of the patent system have 
contributed to this decline in pharmaceutical innovation.14 This Note 
examines the combined effect of two factors within the patent system: 
the increased generic competition faced by innovative firms and the 
inadequacy in patent-claim scope15 for certain pharmaceutical patents. 
It then explores the unrecognized potential of claims with means-
plus-functions clauses (MPF claims) to remedy these problems and 
revitalize pharmaceutical innovation. 
The enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act)16 has rendered 
innovative firms more vulnerable to patent challenges and provided 
great economic incentives for generic manufacturers to initiate these 
challenges as early as possible.17 Although intended to strike a 
balance between innovative firms and generic manufacturers, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act has been widely criticized for unevenly favoring 
the generic side of the industry.18 Since its passage, the United States 
 
 13. Lori Valigra, AstraZeneca, Biogen Look Externally for New Drug Candidates, MASS 
HIGH TECH (May 23, 2011, 2:02 PM EDT), http://www.masshightech.com/stories/2011/05/23/
daily10-AstraZeneca-Biogen-look-externally-for-new-drug-candidates.html. 
 14. Some factors outside the patent system include the high cost of drug development and 
inefficiencies in the research community. See generally Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul 
F. Uhlir & Colin Crossman, Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property 
Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2008) 
(outlining the major obstacles to producing and developing new small-molecule drugs and 
proposing a solution); supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 15. Claims are specific sections in a U.S. patent. Each claim defines the scope of the 
patented invention—that is, the right protected by the patent document. See infra text 
accompanying notes 97–100. 
 16. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, & 35 U.S.C.). 
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the 
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (“For those who ask whether 
Hatch-Waxman was a good deal or a bad deal for the research-based pharmaceutical industry, 
the most learned response is: It was not a good deal . . . .”); Jaclyn L. Miller, Note, Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: The Elimination of Competition Between Drug 
Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 91, 103 (2002) (“These benefits [bestowed by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act] create an unequal playing field that inhibits true competition.”); Mandy 
Wilson, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic Favored Legislation May Cause 
Pioneer Drug Companies To Pull the Plug on Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 510–11 (2002) 
(“Although the 1984 Act was considered a compromise at the time it was passed, generic 
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has seen explosive growth in the generic drug sector,19 which has led 
to both significant savings for consumers and to significant profit 
losses for innovative firms.20 Meanwhile, pharmaceutical patents are 
challenged more often and earlier in their effective lives than they 
were prior to the the Hatch-Waxman Act.21 Whether the current 
patent system affords innovative firms with an adequate level of 
protection, then, is highly debatable. 
Patent protection has two dimensions: the time period during 
which exclusive rights last and the scope of rights as defined by patent 
claims. Effective patent protection requires a patent claim to be 
construed more broadly than its literal language.22 The doctrine of 
equivalents, created by judges to extend the coverage of a claim 
beyond its literal scope, allows a patent holder to exclude from the 
marketplace a competitive product that is either covered by the literal 
meaning of the claim or that presents an equivalent of the claimed 
invention.23 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,24 however, has significantly restricted 
the reach of the doctrine through prosecution-history estoppel.25 
When the scope of a pharmaceutical patent claim is cut to its literal 
 
companies appear to have gained more than they have lost—at the expense of pioneer 
companies.”). 
 19. The generic market share has increased from 49 percent in 2000 to 78 percent in 2010. 
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 10, at i. According to the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association, 10,072 of the 12,751 listed drugs in the FDA’s Approved Drug 
Products with Theraputic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the “Orange Book,” 
have generic counterparts. Facts at a Glance, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, http://
www.gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). The Orange 
Book, available on the FDA’s website, provides a list of patents related to drug products 
approved by the FDA. Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/
default.cfm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012). Additionally, the generic industry is estimated to grow 
at an annual rate of more than 7.8 percent. Facts at a Glance, supra. 
 20. Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Impact of Economic, Regulatory and Patent 
Policies on Innovation in Cancer Chemoprevention, 1 CANCER PREVENTION RES. 84, 86 (2008) 
(“For drugs with significant market sales at the time of patent expiration, the innovator’s brand 
typically loses more than 90% of its market within a few months’ time . . . .”). 
 21. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 22. See Erin Conway, Note, The Aftermath of Festo v. SMC: Is There “Some Other 
Reason” for Justifying the Third Festo Rebuttal Criterion?, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1655, 1658 
(2007) (“Because language is naturally ambiguous, and because a patentable invention is, by 
definition, something that does not already exist in the art, there are times when language 
cannot capture the essence of an invention.”). 
 23. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 24. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 25. See infra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. 
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meaning, a generic manufacturer can make an insubstantial change to 
the patented invention and then outcompete the brand-name drug 
with the generic equivalent product. For example, a pharmaceutical 
formulation claimed purely by the structure of its components can be 
easily designed around by replacing one component with another that 
serves the same function but that has a slightly different structure.26 
Therefore, a patent without adequate scope cannot help the 
innovative firms recover their R&D investment, and this problem 
cannot be solved by a longer patent term. 
In 1952, Congress enacted the new Patent Act (1952 Act),27 
which for the first time provided a statutory basis for MPF claims.28 
Unlike a purely structural claim, in which every element of an 
invention is defined by its structure, an MPF claim defines at least 
one element of the claimed invention by its function.29 MPF claims 
can therefore be relatively difficult for generic manufacturers to 
design around, even with restricted application of the doctrine of 
equivalents. As in the example above, if one component of the 
claimed pharmaceutical formulation is defined by its function, a 
competitor cannot design around the claim by replacing it with a 
component that differs in structure but serves the same function.30 
Despite their statutory authorization, MPF claims remain largely 
unexplored in the pharmaceutical industry. Broader use of MPF 
claims would provide a more appropriate level of patent protection 
for pharmaceutical inventors, which in turn could translate into 
stronger economic incentives for investment. Because the application 
of MPF claims in other technology areas has encountered some 
conceptual and logical difficulties,31 this Note also examines related 
 
 26. MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 29 (3d ed. 2011); see also, e.g., Astra 
Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 423, 510–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the 
generic microtablet did not infringe claim 11 of the of the Prilosec patent because the generic 
manufacturer designed around the claim by developing a formulation that did not require an 
alkaline reacting compound in its core). 
 27. Patent Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.). 
 28. Id. § 112, 66 Stat. at 798 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)), amended by 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011); see also 
infra notes 165–167 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part III.B. 
 31. For a general discussion of the issues encountered when MPF claims are applied in 
other technology areas, see Charles W. Bradley, Means-Plus-Function Clauses in Patent Claims: 
A Tortuous Path, 33 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (2006); and John F. Triggs, 
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issues that can be expected to accompany the application of MPF 
clauses in pharmaceutical patents. 
Part I analyzes the influence of the Hatch-Waxman Act, finding 
that despite its dual purposes—to stimulate innovation and spur 
generic development—it has primarily favored generic manufacturers 
and increased innovative firms’ reliance on patent protection. Part II 
discusses the issue of adequate claim scope for pharmaceutical 
patents, focusing on the consequences of the restriction on the 
doctrine of equivalents. It finds that the current system does not 
properly protect innovative firms from challenges encouraged by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. Part III argues that MPF claims should be used 
more frequently in pharmaceutical patents, which could provide 
innovative firms with a more appropriate level of protection than that 
which already exists. 
I.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND THE RESULTING INCREASED 
NEED FOR ADEQUATE PATENT PROTECTION 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to achieve 
two conflicting, yet related, policy objectives: ensuring timely, 
affordable public access to drugs and encouraging new product 
development.32 Although intended to benefit both innovative firms 
and generic manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act has mainly 
benefitted generic manufacturers by accelerating the market entry of 
generic drugs. Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act has resulted in 
heavily restricted trade-secret protection for innovative firms in the 
United States, leading these firms to depend almost exclusively on the 
patent system to profit. This Part briefly reviews the history and 
relevant provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act and discusses how it 
has influenced pharmaceutical innovation. 
A. History and Background of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
1. Prior Drug Regulation.  The Hatch-Waxman Act tried to solve 
problems following two earlier regulations of drugs—the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA)33 and the 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
 
Functional Claiming: § 112 ¶ 6 Still Difficult After All These Years, LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2011, 
at 31. 
 32. Colleen Kelly, Note, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-
Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 417 (2011). 
 33. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 653, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
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Amendment (1962 Amendment).34 The FDCA was the first federal 
law to require testing to ensure drug safety.35 Pursuant to the FDCA, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers must submit to the FDA a New Drug 
Application (NDA), which includes safety-testing results. The FDCA 
also imbued the FDA with the authority to prohibit the marketing of 
drugs that it deemed unsafe or that lacked sufficient safety data.36 
Later, Congress enacted the 1962 Amendment, which changed the 
NDA from a premarket notification process into an affirmative 
approval system.37 Under the new system, drug manufacturers are 
required to submit data demonstrating both safety and efficacy for 
every new drug and are prohibited from using the new drug in the 
marketplace until obtaining affirmative approval from the FDA.38 
2. Issues with Patent Terms.  Following the 1962 Amendment, 
patent-term adjustment became a highly debated issue. Innovative 
firms felt that the new law had shortened the effective patent term for 
new drugs, whereas generic manufacturers felt the patent terms were 
improperly extended.39 Innovative manufacturers also raised concerns 
about the reduced incentives for R&D investment in new drug 
products because the heightened regulatory standard resulted in a 
lengthened approval process.40 For innovative firms, which are usually 
forced to file patent applications immediately after the discovery of a 
potential drug candidate,41 the longer approval process meant shorter 
 
 34. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 35. Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA 
CONSUMER, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 14, 17. 
 36. Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and 
Canada, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 215, 218–19 (1999). 
 37. Drug Amendments of 1962, § 104(a), 76 Stat. at 784 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 355(a)). 
 38. Kelly, supra note 32, at 420. 
 39. See Gidcumb, supra note 3, at 32–33 (“[P]atent holders felt that they lost effective 
patent term time and significant amounts of potential profit because of the delay in gaining 
FDA approval. . . [Generic manufactures found there to be] a ‘de facto extension to the patent 
term.’” (quoting Edward V. Filardi, Patent Issues That Both Regulatory Affairs Personnel and 
Patent Attorneys Should Understand, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 215, 215 (1999))). 
 40. Between 1958 and 1979, the number of new FDA-approved products fell by 81 percent. 
Matthew Hinsch, Hoecsht-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Lehman, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
163, 163–64 (1998). The decline was largely attributed to the heightened standard of the FDA-
approval process. Id. at 164. 
 41. Inadvertent disclosure can make an otherwise-patentable invention fail the “novelty” 
requirement of patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), (n), 125 Stat. 284, 285, 293 (2011). This condition will still be 
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effective patent terms because the clock for a patent term might start 
running years before the patented drug product was approved for 
marketing.42 As a result, the heightened regulatory standard without a 
corresponding patent-term adjustment caused significant economic 
loss for innovative firms.43 
While innovative firms clamored for a restoration of the effective 
patent term lost during the regulatory review processes as a result of 
the 1962 Amendment, generic manufacturers also lobbied for a 
change in patent law to allow earlier market entry for their products. 
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,44 the Federal 
Circuit held that a generic competitor’s use of a patented ingredient 
to perform tests for the purpose of obtaining FDA approval of its 
product infringed the patent.45 Accordingly, generic manufacturers 
could not begin to test their versions of brand-name drugs until 
related patents had expired, which, the generic manufacturers argued, 
amounted to a de facto extension to the patent term.46 
B. Relevant Provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act 
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended patent law to address patent-
term adjustment. It also provided a new drug regulatory scheme that 
superseded all prior FDA policies and procedures governing the 
marketing and approval of generic drugs.47 Among other things, the 
new scheme established a certification process for generic 
manufacturers to challenge drug patents, which has since resulted in 
 
true under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (America Invents Act), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
125 Stat. 284 (2011), when its first-inventor-to-file provisions become effective on March 16, 
2013, id. § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293. 
 42. For example, if a new drug was patented three years before it was approved for 
marketing, the innovative firm lost the three years during which it derived no economic benefit. 
 43. Susan E. Kopp, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: 
Is It a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 945, 971 (1989) 
(“The three years [needed to obtain FDA approval after NDA submission], combined with the 
average of seven to ten years of research expended to produce the drug, is far too great an 
investment of time and resources to be economically feasible . . . .”). 
 44. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 
Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 45. Id. at 863 (“We cannot . . . allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of ‘scientific 
inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial 
purposes.”). 
 46. Gidcumb, supra note 3, at 33. 
 47. Kelly, supra note 32, at 420. 
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controversial litigation and developed into a major form of generic 
competition against innovative firms.48 
1. Changes in Patent Law: Patent-Term Adjustment and the 
Testing Exception for Generic Manufacturers.  The Hatch-Waxman 
Act addressed concerns from both innovative firms and generic 
manufacturers with respect to effective patent terms. First, it includes 
a patent-term restoration provision to remedy the loss in effective 
terms for drug patents caused by the lengthy regulatory processes.49 
The statute provides that the term of an eligible drug patent “shall be 
extended by the time equal to the regulatory review period for the 
approved product which period occurs after the date the patent is 
issued.”50 The restoration is subject to limitations.51 
Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act overrules Bolar, permitting 
generic manufacturers to use patented brand-name drugs before 
patent expiration for activities “reasonably related” to the purpose of 
seeking FDA approval of their drugs.52 With this provision, generic 
manufacturers can start the regulatory-review process for their 
products before relevant patents expire, which greatly accelerates the 
market entry of generic drugs. 
2. The New Scheme of Generic-Drug Regulation.  The Hatch-
Waxman Act also revised the FDCA to streamline the regulatory-
approval process for generic drugs by extending the use of the 
 
 48. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 49. This provision was passed under Title II of the Hatch-Waxman Act and codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 156 (2006), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 37, 
125 Stat. 284, 341 (2011). 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c). 
 51. First, the maximum patent-term extension cannot exceed five years; second, the total 
patent term plus any restoration extension cannot exceed fourteen years from the date of FDA 
approval; third, the period that can be restored will be reduced by any period during which the 
applicant did not act with due diligence. Id. § 156(c)(1), (c)(3), (g)(6)(a). Some scholars view the 
fourteen-year limit as inadequate because many nondrug patents get a seventeen-year useful 
term. See, e.g., Sherry M. Knowles, Fixing the Legal Framework for Pharmaceutical Research, 
327 SCIENCE 1083, 1083 (2010) (“This creates the situation where a relatively unregulated, 
simple, inexpensive invention may receive 17 years or more of useful patent term, whereas more 
expensive and important pharmaceutical innovations get useful patent terms capped at 14 
years . . . .”). 
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, 
or sell . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law . . . .”). 
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Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).53 As a result, generic 
manufacturers can have their products more quickly and 
inexpensively approved for marketing. Under the new regulation, 
ANDA filers only need to submit data to show that their products are 
“bioequivalent[s]” of the brand-name drugs to gain FDA approval.54 
This process costs much less than a full NDA, which requires 
independent research and separate clinical data to prove the safety 
and efficacy of the drug products.55 
The Hatch-Waxman Act further facilitates ANDA filing by 
putting a statutory limit on data exclusivity for brand-name drugs. 
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the safety and efficacy data of drugs 
were treated as trade secrets, which were not accessible to other drug 
manufacturers or the public at large.56 Under the new regulatory 
scheme, the safety and efficacy data of brand-name drugs enjoy only a 
limited time of exclusivity.57 After the exclusivity period ends, generic 
companies can use the data to seek regulatory approval for their 
products in ANDA filings.58 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides that 
the term of data exclusivity is limited to five years for drug products 
containing a New Chemical Entity (NCE).59 For non-NCE drug 
products,60 data exclusivity is limited to three years.61 Moreover, 
 
 53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). Before 1984, generic manufacturers could 
only use an ANDA for pre-1962 brand-name drugs that the FDA had deemed safe and effective 
under its Drug Efficacy Study Implementation program. Kelly, supra note 32, at 420. The 
Hatch-Waxman Act expanded the ANDA process to all post-1962 brand-name drugs. Id. at 421. 
 54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006). “Bioequivalent” is defined in § 355(j)(8)(B). 
 55. Kelly, supra note 32, at 423. Additionally, generic companies can also choose to file a 
paper NDA, also known as a section 505(b)(2) NDA under the FDCA. Id. at 423 & n.62; see 
also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (specifying the requirements for “[a]n application submitted . . . for a 
drug for which the investigations described [earlier in the section] and relied upon by the 
applicant for approval of the application were not conducted by or for the applicant”). A paper 
NDA is similar to a full NDA except that in a paper NDA, generic manufacturers can use 
published scientific data to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of their drugs. Id. at 423 n.62. 
 56. Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 93, 97–98 (2004). 
 57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(i)–(iv). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). A “[n]ew chemical entity” is a drug that contains no “active 
moiety” that has been approved in another NDA. New Drug Product Exclusivity, 21 
C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2012). An “active moiety” is “the molecule or ion, excluding those 
appended portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an ester, salt . . . or other 
noncovalent derivative . . . , responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the 
drug substance.” Id. 
 60. These products include new formulations or salts, new indications, new dosage forms, 
new dosage strengths, new routes of administration, or new combinations of previously 
approved drugs. 
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although the FDA cannot issue an approval for an equivalent generic 
product before the data-exclusivity period on the branded product 
expires, a generic company can file an ANDA for its version of a non-
NCE product during the three-year period, anticipating an immediate 
approval at the end of the exclusivity period.62 
3. Paragraph IV Challenges: The Intersection of Patent Law and 
Drug Law.  The ANDA process includes a mechanism by which the 
branded companies and generic manufacturers can resolve any patent 
disputes. The Hatch-Waxman Act requires branded companies to 
provide the FDA with a list of patents related to their drug products63 
and requires the FDA to make the lists publicly available64 in its 
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, 
commonly known as the “Orange Book.”65 As part of the ANDA 
process, generic manufacturers are required to file a certification for 
each Orange Book patent listed under the drug that they intend to 
offer as a generic, stating: (1) the patent information has not been 
filed with the FDA, (2) the patent has expired, (3) the generic will not 
enter the market prior to the date on which the patent expires, or (4) 
the patent is invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed on by the 
new drug for which the application is submitted.66 The fourth 
assertion is referred to as a “Paragraph IV certification.”67 
The Hatch-Waxman Act treats the ANDA, filed together with a 
Paragraph IV certification, as a technical act of patent infringement—
otherwise known as a PIV challenge.68 Thus, the innovative firms and 
generic manufacturers can resolve their patent dispute before the 
generic drug reaches the market. The innovative firm is promptly 
notified after an ANDA is filed with a Paragraph IV certification 
 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv). 
 62. See id. (setting the date by which the FDA may “make the approval of an 
application . . . effective”). 
 63. See id. § 355(b)(1)(G) (“The applicant shall file with the application the patent number 
and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug . . . or which claims a method of 
using such drug . . . .”). 
 64. Id. § 355(j)(7).  
 65. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, 
supra note 19. 
 66. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(vii). 
 67. E.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 68. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (Supp. IV 2011). 
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against its product.69 Upon receiving the notice, the innovative firm 
has forty-five days to file a patent-infringement action against the 
generic competitor, the ANDA applicant. This action keeps the FDA 
from approving the ANDA until either the generic company 
successfully defends the case in court or for thirty months.70 If, 
however, the innovator decides not to initiate an infringement action, 
the FDA can immediately approve the ANDA.71 To encourage 
ANDA filing, the Hatch-Waxman Act grants 180 days of market 
exclusivity to the first filer that succeeds in the PIV challenge, 
meaning that no other generic manufacturer can enter the market 
during this time with a competing equivalent product.72 
C. Influence on the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The Hatch-Waxman Act has substantially shaped the 
pharmaceutical industry. Most significantly, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
has greatly emboldened generic competition against innovative firms 
in the form of a growing number of PIV challenges.73 Although the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was designed partly to restore patent terms for 
innovators corresponding to the time lost during regulatory review, it 
is debatable whether this benefit has actually materialized.74 As a 
result, innovative firms live in a relatively hostile environment 
wherein available patent protection is constantly vulnerable to 
challenges—often at the earliest possible moment—and trade-secret 
protection previously accorded indefinitely to safety and efficacy data 
is limited to a maximum of five years.75 This underprotection of 
intellectual property rights is at least partly responsible for the 
financial problems faced by branded firms and the stifled 
pharmaceutical innovation—reflected by the drying up of new-
product pipelines in pharmaceutical companies.76 
 
 69. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2006). 
 70. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 73. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 614 (“[T]he prevalence of [PIV] challenges 
has risen dramatically over the past 25 years . . . .”). 
 74. In February 1988, forty extensions were granted to drug patents with an average of 1.8 
years. Miller, supra note 18, at 107. Yet the average period of review for these drugs averaged 
8.2 years. Id. 
 75. See supra Part I.B.2; infra Part I.C.3. 
 76. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 4, at 370 (“[O]ne particular U.S. regulation—the 
Paragraph IV patent challenge—is increasingly stifling new drug innovation . . . .”). 
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1. The Burgeoning of PIV Challenges.  The sharp increase in PIV 
challenges began after a Federal Circuit case decided in 2000, Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.77 In Eli Lilly, the generic 
company Barr Laboratories won a PIV challenge by invalidating one 
claim in the patent on the drug fluoxetine, known commercially as 
Prozac.78 After Eli Lilly, both the number of generic companies that 
are active in PIV filing and the number of products being challenged 
have rapidly increased.79 The number of lawsuits filed involving PIV 
challenges has gone up from thirty-five in 2001 to 242 in 2011, a more 
than sixfold increase.80 As of November 2012, 243 products are under 
PIV challenges, and many are attacked by multiple generic 
manufacturers.81 
This proliferation of PIV challenges is a direct result of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. In addition to the much cheaper ANDA 
procedure, the 180-day market-exclusivity period also serves as a 
strong economic incentive for generic manufacturers to file an 
ANDA.82 Without competition, the successful generic challenger can 
price their products at a level close to that of the innovator, reaping 
significant economic gain. 
As estimated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
average revenue generated by a successful PIV challenge is $60 
million, whereas the average cost of a challenge is about $5 million.83 
A generic company, then, only needs to win one in every twelve 
challenges to make a profit. In reality, generic companies have done 
much better than that. As provided by the FTC study, from 1992 to 
2000, 72 percent of PIV challenges filed led to litigation, and generic 
companies won 42 percent of the cases.84 The great economic return 
 
 77. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Gregory Glass, 
Pharmaceutical Patent Challenges—Time for Reassessment?, 3 NATURE REVS.: DRUG 
DISCOVERY 1057, 1057 (2004) (“In the period from 1984 to 2000, only a few generics companies 
were equipped and willing to withstand the expenses of product development and ensuing legal 
battles. Starting in 2000, after Barr Labs successfully challenged the Lilly blockbuster fluoxetine 
(Prozac), these generics companies started to incorporate Paragraph IV patent challenges as 
part of their core business strategies.”). 
 78. Eli Lilly & Co., 251 F.3d at 958–59. 
 79. Glass, supra note 77, at 1058. 
 80. Data are available at a subscription-based website. THE PARAGRAPH FOUR REPORT, 
http://www.paragraphfour.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). 
 83. Higgins & Graham, supra note 4, at 370. 
 84. Id. More recent data can be found in THE PARAGRAPH FOUR REPORT, supra note 80. 
Of the 320 PIV cases decided in U.S. district courts in recent years, the innovative firms won 
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from PIV challenges has led to the popularity of “prospecting” among 
generic companies—a business strategy whereby generic companies 
file a wide range of PIV challenges in the hope of winning a small 
fraction of those challenges.85 Because patent litigation can easily cost 
millions of dollars, meritless PIV challenges have resulted in 
increased transaction costs to the patent system, which is especially 
problematic for start-ups and small innovative companies that lack 
the resources for litigation. 
2. Early Patent Challenges.  In addition to providing financial 
rewards, the Hatch-Waxman Act has enabled generic companies to 
file PIV challenges at an early stage of the patent term after the 
relevant regulatory exclusivity has expired.86 By overruling Bolar, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act allows a generic manufacturer to use a patented 
product to conduct bioequivalency studies for the ANDA process.87 
After gathering sufficient data, the generic manufacturer can decide 
to push for market entry before the patent expires by filing a PIV 
challenge, alleging that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, not 
infringed by its product, or a combination thereof. 
Because the regulatory review process for an ANDA is short,88 
the generic manufacturer can potentially enter the market long 
before the full statutory term of the patent expires. Even if it loses the 
PIV challenge, it can still market its drug immediately after the patent 
expires, years earlier than what was possible before 1984.89 
3. Loss of Trade-Secret Protection for Innovative Firms.  
Moreover, the data-exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
have significantly reduced trade-secret protection for innovative 
 
only 95 (29.7 percent), whereas generic companies won 68 (21.3 percent), and 157 cases (49.1 
percent) went to settlement. Id. The data were last updated in November 2012 and include the 
outcomes from all cases pending as of November 1, 2003. Id. 
 85. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 614–15. 
 86. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and 
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 327 (2012) (demonstrating 
“a sharp[] increase for early [PIV] challenges” between 2001 and 2010). 
 87. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 88. A generic company meeting the statutory requirements can file an ANDA and receive 
a response from the FDA within 150 days. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F) (Supp. V 2012), as amended 
by Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 1135, 126 
Stat. 993, 1135 (2012). 
 89. See Wilson, supra note 18, at 510 (“With the benefits of shortened FDA approval 
[under the Hatch-Waxman Act] . . . , a generic drug has the ability to be on the market almost 
immediately after a pioneer patent expires.”). 
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firms. Hatch-Waxman’s mandatory data disclosure meant loss of 
trade secrets, a hitherto significant barrier that protected innovative 
firms from generic competition. Generic manufacturers previously 
might not have been able to sell a particular drug on the market 
because they lacked the resources to obtain the safety and efficacy 
data required to obtain regulatory approval. Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, however, generic manufacturers have access to the data 
generated by the innovative firms after the data-exclusivity period 
expires and thus must only generate bioequivalency data to gain 
regulatory approval. Due to diminished trade-secret protection, 
innovative firms have had to rely more heavily on the patent system 
to protect their economic interests. 
4. Reduced Patent Protection for Innovators.  The rapid increase 
of PIV challenges has led to reduced patent protection for innovators 
because they lose market exclusivity if the relevant patents are found 
to be invalid, unenforceable, or noninfringed by the generic product. 
In reality, innovative firms are not only under attack,90 but they are 
losing a significant number of these battles.91 Due to the prevalence of 
PIV challenges, the average market life for brand-name drugs facing 
a first generic entry between 2001 and 2010 is only twelve years 
despite the nominal sixteen-year patent term.92 Studies have also 
shown that the average market-exclusivity period has decreased 
significantly since the mid-1990s.93 This decrease could reduce 
 
 90. As of November 2012, 132 branded companies have products that are under active PIV 
challenge. THE PARAGRAPH FOUR REPORT, supra note 80. 
 91. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Also note that the data shown here 
underestimate the actual loss suffered by innovative firms because the fraction of ANDA filings 
with PIV challenges that do not lead to litigation has not been taken into account. One 
contributing factor for innovative firms to decide not to litigate is that they have only forty-five 
days to file the lawsuit upon receiving the notice of ANDA filing. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) 
(2006) (stating that approval of an application with a PIV certification will be effective 
immediately unless the patent holder brings an infringement action within the forty-five-day 
time frame). The innovative firms may also give up if they conclude that they will likely lose in 
court anyway. But for the PIV challenges, litigation would be commenced much later in time, if 
it occurred at all. 
 92. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 86, at 336. 
 93. See Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market 
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 497 (2007) 
(reporting that the effective market life for the ten drugs has decreased from 13.8 years between 
1995–2001 to 11.2 years between 2002–2005). But see Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 86, at 336 
(concluding that the average effective market life for drug products did not change much 
between the 1990s and 2000s). Even if the overall effective market life has not decreased, the 
TANG IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2013  4:43 PM 
2013] MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION PATENT CLAUSES 1085 
anticipated profitability for potential drug products, making them less 
attractive to investors. Indeed, some innovative firms would assert 
that pervasive patent challenges pose a more severe problem than 
patent expiration.94 
These observations compel one question: Why are innovative 
firms losing so many PIV challenges? Or put differently, why do 
pharmaceutical patents appear so weak when under attack? The 
patent holders lose in two ways: first, the patent is found invalid, 
unenforceable, or both; second, the claim is so narrow in scope that it 
does not cover the alleged infringing product.95 As discussed in Part 
II, patent claims tend to be narrowly construed due to judicially 
restrictive application of the doctrine of equivalents. Consequently, 
the actual protection afforded by many patents is slim in scope, which 
at least partially explains the failure of innovative firms to cope with 
the increase of PIV challenges. Although the problem of inadequate 
patent scope is not a product of the Hatch-Waxman Act, it has 
become particularly prevalent as the Hatch-Waxman Act has left 
innovative firms increasingly reliant on the patent system. 
In summary, after enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, 
the prospecting strategy gained popularity among generic companies 
and created serious problems for innovative firms. As discussed in 
detail in Part II, these problems are further exacerbated by the 
inadequate claim scope of pharmaceutical patents, as construed by 
courts. These two factors combined have substantially contributed to 
the decrease in R&D investments and the drying up of new product 
pipelines in the pharmaceutical industry. 
II.  EFFECTIVE PATENT-CLAIM SCOPE: FESTO AND THE DOCTRINE 
OF EQUIVALENTS 
To protect themselves from fierce generic competition, 
innovators rely heavily on the patent system. Restrictive application 
of the doctrine of equivalents, however, has unduly narrowed the 
claim scope of pharmaceutical patents and has significantly limited 
the patent protection available for innovators. Patents can only 
 
patent term is less secure, the risk to the firm is higher, and the cost of drug development is 
increased due to litigation costs, all of which contribute to the loss of incentives for investors. 
 94. Glass, supra note 77, at 1057. 
 95. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006) (providing that a successful PIV challenge 
requires a generic manufacturer to establish that “such patent is invalid or will not be infringed 
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted”). 
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incentivize investment when they have the scope necessary to 
effectively confer the benefit of market exclusivity and thus help the 
innovators recoup their investments. If a patent claim has too narrow 
of a scope, competitors can use information disclosed in the patent to 
design around the slim-cut claim and develop an equivalent, yet 
noninfringing, product. Because a patent with a narrow scope may be 
worse than no patent at all in attracting investors,96 granting adequate 
scope for patent claims is critical for the patent system to efficiently 
encourage R&D investment. 
As Judge Raymond Clevenger of the Federal Circuit has noted, 
“[T]he name of the game is the claim.”97 Claims are the most critical 
component of a patent because they mark the boundaries of an 
invention.98 During prosecution,99 claims are intensely scrutinized by 
examiners in the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) to determine their patentability.100 During litigation, claim 
construction is performed as a preliminary matter in a separate 
hearing (also known as a Markman hearing)101 and often can be 
dispositive in determining the outcome of the case.102 For a long time 
in the U.S. patent system’s history, the doctrine of equivalents played 
 
 96. See Jean Burke Fordis & William L. Leschensky, Advanced Bio/Chemical Claim 
Drafting Issues, in ADVANCED PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP 2009: CLAIM DRAFTING & 
AMENDMENT WRITING at 691, 738 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-977, 
2009) (“Claims that are drawn too narrowly give the invention away without adequate 
protection, and may be worse than no patent at all, which at least offers the possibility of trade 
secret protection and does not broadcast the invention to the world.”). 
 97. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 98. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“It is a ‘bedrock 
principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is 
entitled the right to exclude.’” (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). 
 99. Prosecution of a patent describes the process whereby applicants or their 
representatives interact with an examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) with regard to a pending application for a patent. 
 100. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (“[T]he rules of the PTO require that application claims 
must ‘conform to the invention . . . and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear 
support or antecedent basis . . . .’” (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1))). 
 101. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (“The 
[construction of patent claims] is a question of law, to be determined by the court . . . .” (quoting 
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1854)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 102. John M. Benassi, Melinda Luthin & David W. Mulliken, Claim Construction and 
Proving Infringement: Impact of Phillips and Festo and Their Progeny, in PATENT LITIGATION 
2007, at 57, 65 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series G-910, 2007) (“[A] claim term’s 
construction is often dispositive in determining claim validity in light of prior art.”). 
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a vital role in providing patents with adequate scope.103 This doctrine, 
however, has been applied less consistently, even sparingly, in recent 
decades. This Part reviews the history of this doctrine and discusses 
how its restrictive application has affected pharmaceutical innovation, 
especially in view of the growing number of PIV challenges. 
A. The Doctrine of Equivalents 
Since the 1850s, the Supreme Court has used the doctrine of 
equivalents to provide adequate claim scope for patent holders.104 To 
prove infringement, a patent holder must demonstrate that the 
claimed invention covers the alleged product, which requires 
construction of the terms in the claim.105 Generally, courts interpret 
patent terms according to the “ordinary and customary meaning” of 
the words used.106 But, due to the inherent ambiguity in and 
limitations of language, a literal reading of the patent claims 
sometimes cannot capture the essential scope of the invention.107 
Restricting the protection to the literal scope of claims could allow a 
competitor to make insubstantial modifications and avoid 
infringement.108 
The doctrine of equivalents broadens the claim’s scope beyond 
its literal boundaries. Under this doctrine, “a product or process that 
does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim 
may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between 
the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed 
elements of the patented invention.”109 In other words, in situations in 
which patent holders cannot prove literal infringement because the 
 
 103. See Conway, supra note 22, at 1659 (“[T]he Supreme Court in Winans v. Denmead[, 56 
U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854),] adopted the doctrine of equivalents in 1853 . . . .”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 374 (“Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that 
the patent claim ‘covers the alleged infringer’s product or process,’ which in turn necessitates a 
determination of ‘what the words in the claim mean.’” (quoting HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, 
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995))). 
 106. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We have frequently 
stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” 
(quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996))). 
 107. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). 
 108. See id. (“If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be 
greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat 
the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying.”). 
 109. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (quoting 
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). 
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literal language of the claim does not cover the accused product, they 
can still prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by 
showing that the accused product is an equivalent of the claimed 
invention. To determine whether the alleged infringing product or 
process is an equivalent of the claimed invention, courts have 
developed a “function-way-result” test, which provides that 
equivalency will be found when “two devices do the same work in 
substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same 
result.”110 
B. Prosecution-History Estoppel Under Festo 
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is subject to a number 
of limitations, the most significant of which is prosecution-history 
estoppel.111 Prosecution-history estoppel prevents patent holders from 
using the doctrine of equivalents to prove infringement if they have 
surrendered the subject matter at issue during prosecution 
proceedings.112 In other words, if the subject matter is excluded from a 
claim by a narrowing amendment to comply with a patentability 
requirement, patent holders cannot reclaim it under the doctrine of 
equivalents during litigation. Thus, estoppel often provides a 
powerful check on the application of the doctrine of equivalents in 
the pharmaceutical industry, especially after the Festo decision. 
In Festo, the Supreme Court reexamined the interaction between 
prosecution-history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents and 
provided new guidelines for their application.113 Whether intended by 
the Court or not, the decision created a powerful estoppel that has 
resulted in a much more limited version of the doctrine of 
 
 110. Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878). Courts have also examined the issue of 
equivalency by asking (1) whether there are only “insubstantial differences” between the 
accused device and claimed invention, Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); or (2) whether the claimed limitation is 
interchangeable with the corresponding elements in the accused device, Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 111. Benassi et al., supra note 102, at 93–94. Other limitations on the doctrine of equivalents 
include the all-element rule, the public-dedication rule, and prior art. Id. at 93. Briefly, the all-
element rule states that the doctrine applies to each discrete element of the claim rather than to 
the whole invention. Id. at 94. The public-dedication rule provides that the doctrine cannot be 
used to recapture unclaimed subject matter that has already been disclosed to the public in the 
patent application. Id. Finally, the scope of a patent cannot be extended to cover prior art. Id. 
 112. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 113. Festo, 535 U.S. at 736, 740. 
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equivalents.114 In short, the Court revisited the policy justifications for 
both doctrines and relied on its precedents to hold the following: 
First, a narrowing amendment115 made to satisfy any patentability 
requirement may give rise to estoppel.116 Second, estoppel establishes 
a presumption of a complete bar for invoking the doctrine of 
equivalents unless the patent holder carries the burden to show that 
the amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in 
question.117 
The first holding greatly expands the reach of prosecution-
history estoppel. Before a patent can be issued, it must satisfy a set of 
statutory requirements both with respect to its substance and to its 
formality. The claimed subject matter must be useful, novel, and 
nonobvious,118 and the patent application must describe and enable 
the embodiment of the invention.119 In prior cases, prosecution-history 
estoppel had only been applied “where claims have been amended for 
a limited set of reasons [related to subject matter], such as to avoid 
prior art, or otherwise to address a specific concern—such as 
obviousness.”120 In Festo, the Court explicitly rejected this substance-
based categorical limitation on the application of estoppel, reasoning 
that any amendment, if not “truly cosmetic,” would narrow the 
patent-claim scope and raise the estoppel issue.121 
Regarding the effect of establishing estoppel, the Court framed 
the question as, “Does the estoppel bar the inventor from asserting 
infringement against any equivalent to the narrowed element or 
 
 114. See infra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. 
 115. An amendment is the procedure by which the patent applicant, while prosecuting a 
patent from the USPTO, makes changes to the initially submitted patent claims to satisfy 
patentability requirements. The amendments can be either substantive or formalistic and can 
either broaden or narrow the scope of the claim. 
 116. Festo, 535 U.S. at 736. 
 117. Id. at 740. 
 118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), (c), (n), 125 Stat. 284, 285, 287, 293 (2011). 
 119. Id. § 112(a) (2006), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 
at 296. 
 120. Festo, 535 U.S. at 735 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 
U.S. 17, 30–32 (1997)). 
 121. Id. at 736–37. According to the Court, a patent holder who has amended “a claim as a 
condition for obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader subject matter, whether the 
amendment was made to avoid the prior art [to satisfy the subject matter requirement,] or to 
comply with § 112 [to satisfy the formality requirement].” Id. at 737. 
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might some equivalents still infringe?”122 With the holding of the 
“presumption” rule, estoppel establishes a presumption of a complete 
bar for asserting equivalents. This presumption is only rebuttable 
when the patent holder proves that 
[t]he equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the 
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no 
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there 
may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not 
reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial 
substitute in question.123 
In reaching these holdings, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
“notice” goal of patent law.124 Patent law requires that inventors 
describe their inventions in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms” to 
receive the benefit of patent protection.125 This requirement seeks to 
make boundaries of patent claims as clear as possible to promote 
efficient investment in innovation.126 Without knowing with some 
certainty where a patent’s exclusionary rights end, competitors might 
be deterred from manufacturing legitimate products that are outside 
of the scope of the patent.127 They might also accidentally invest in 
products that are secured by a patent, resulting in inefficient 
allocation of resources and wasteful litigation.128 
The doctrine of equivalents, while serving the critical role of 
ensuring fair value for patents, simultaneously makes the scope of 
patents uncertain because of the difficulty in anticipating the entire 
breadth of equivalents. To alleviate this uncertainty, prosecution-
history estoppel provides that the prosecution proceedings in the 
USPTO should be examined to determine the proper scope of 
 
 122. Id. at 740–41 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals adopted a “complete bar” rule, 
which would disallow any assertion of equivalent and reduce the claim scope to its “strict literal 
terms.” Id. at 737. The Supreme Court deemed this per se rule to be unprecedented, id., and 
found that it might have jeopardized the “balances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the 
numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected by our decision,” id. 
at 739. 
 123. Id. at 740–41 (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at 739. 
 125. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). This particular requirement does not change after the 
America Invents Act. 
 126. Festo, 535 U.S. at 730–31. 
 127. Id. at 732. 
 128. Id. 
TANG IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2013  4:43 PM 
2013] MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION PATENT CLAUSES 1091 
equivalents for any element of a claim.129 An applicant who has 
narrowed a claim element to overcome a rejection during prosecution 
is thus prohibited from arguing in subsequent litigation that the 
surrendered subject matter should be deemed as equivalent to the 
literal claims of the issued patents.130 Therefore, prosecution-history 
estoppel provides checks on the reach of the doctrine of equivalents 
and ensures that its application “remains tied to its underlying 
purpose.”131 
Festo first appeared to be a victory for patent holders because 
they were granted the opportunity to rebut the presumption of a 
complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents when estoppel is in 
effect.132 Due to the practical difficulty in rebutting the presumption133 
and the strict rule that any narrowing amendment, substantive or not, 
creates a presumption of estoppel, Festo actually resulted in an 
estoppel doctrine so powerful that it has practically eliminated the 
doctrine of equivalents.134 In fact, in light of this ruling and subsequent 
cases, some practitioners have suggested that “it appears likely that 
only those patents that make it through the PTO unamended will 
enjoy the previous scope of the doctrine of equivalents.”135 
C. Effects of Festo on PIV Challenges: A Hypothetical 
As discussed in Part I, the increasing use of PIV challenges by 
generic manufacturers following the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act has become a major threat to innovative pharmaceutical 
companies, as they face constant challenges to their patents and 
actually lose many of those battles. One important factor that 
contributes to their losses is the restrictive application of the doctrine 
of equivalents under Festo, which makes it much easier for the 
generic manufacturers to design around the patent. 
There are three major types of pharmaceutical patents: drug-
substance patents, which claim the active ingredients of drugs (also 
known as AI patents); drug-product patents, which claim either 
 
 129. Id. at 733. 
 130. Id. at 733–34. 
 131. Id. at 734–35. 
 132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Benassi et al., supra note 102, at 66 (“[F]or patentees, this rebuttal opportunity 
turned out to be more hype than hope . . . because of practical obstacles to producing 
compelling evidence that will suffice to rebut the presumption.”). 
 134. Triggs, supra note 31, at 31. 
 135. Benassi et al., supra note 102, at 67. 
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particular drug formulations or compositions; and finally, method-of-
use patents, which claim various therapeutic indications of a specific 
drug.136 This Section uses a drug-product patent claim as an example 
to illustrate how the restricted application of the doctrine of 
equivalents under Festo fails to provide appropriate protection for 
innovators. 
Assume that an innovative firm (Innovator) has spent millions of 
dollars to develop a new formulation of its drug X. The patent of the 
formulation is listed as drug X in the Orange Book, and a generic 
manufacturer (Generic) files a PIV challenge alleging that its own 
version of drug X, X1, does not infringe Innovator’s patent. A drug 
formulation often contains active ingredients plus an inert carrier, 
which usually helps optimize the effect of the drug through a variety 
of mechanisms.137 Here, assume that X comprises three elements: two 
active ingredients, A and B, plus a specific carrier C, which improves 
A’s absorption by the human body. The active ingredients A and B 
are critical to the drug’s efficacy and safety and cannot be easily 
replaced.138 There may be a number of potential substituents for 
carrier C that, much like carrier C, improve A’s absorption through 
the same mechanism. These substituents usually can be easily 
identified according to the specific mechanism of C as revealed in the 
patent. Here, assume that Generic has identified carrier C1 as a 
replacement of C and developed X1 that comprises A, B, and C1. All 
Generic needs to do to gain FDA approval for X1 is to demonstrate 
that X1 is a bioequivalent to X, which should be relatively easy. 
When Generic files the ANDA for drug X1, Innovator will 
receive a notice and have forty-five days to file a lawsuit to allege 
infringement. If Innovator fails to do so, X1 will be considered 
noninfringing and can enter the market as soon as the regulatory 
exclusivity period for X ends and the ANDA is approved. Because X 
is a new formula, which is a non-NCE drug product,139 it only enjoys 
three years of data exclusivity and the ANDA for X1 can be 
 
 136. Submission of Patent Information, 21 C.F.R. § 314.53 (2012). 
 137. See U.S. FDA Drug Definitions, REGISTRAR CORP, http://www.registrarcorp.com/fda-
guidance/fda-definitions/drugs.jsp (last visited Jan. 16, 2012) (defining pharmaceutical 
formulation as “the process in which different chemical substances, including the active drug, 
are combined to produce a final medicinal product”). 
 138. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (providing that generic manufacturers will not 
be able to get ANDA approval if they change the active ingredients), as amended by Food and 
Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (2012). 
 139. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
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approved immediately after the three-year period expires.140 If 
Innovator, however, chooses to litigate and succeeds in the litigation, 
it will enjoy the full twenty-year term of patent protection,141 several 
times longer than the data-exclusivity period. Thus, the difference in 
potential economic return for Innovator between the two scenarios is 
quite substantial. 
Assuming that Innovator has timely initiated the lawsuit, what 
would be the likely outcome? Because drug X1 does not use C as its 
carrier, the literal scope of the patent does not cover X1, and 
Innovator’s only hope is to win under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Under Festo, the threshold issue is whether the carrier claim element 
has been narrowed to satisfy the patentability requirement.142 
Assuming, as is often the case, that the element was amended to C 
from a broader recitation encompassing C,143 the Festo ruling applies 
and the carrier element is limited to its literal scope—C but not C’s 
equivalents. Consequently, unless Innovator establishes one of the 
three exceptions to the Festo presumption, which is difficult to do,144 
estoppel will apply and Generic will likely win on noninfringement, 
causing Innovator to lose most of its market for X a few months after 
the three-year exclusivity period ends.145 
The scenario described above is not unusual in today’s 
pharmaceutical industry, and it can at least partially explain why 
innovative firms are losing so many patent battles.146 One might argue, 
however, that this example only represents non-AI patents, which are 
by nature less novel or innovative than AI patents. As a matter of 
fact, an empirical study published in 2011 found that generic 
 
 140. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 141. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (providing for twenty-year terms), as amended by 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 3(j), 20(j)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 290, 335 
(2011). 
 142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 143. This is especially likely to happen if the patent was issued before the Festo ruling 
because Festo strongly discourages narrowing amendments. See supra notes 134–135 and 
accompanying text. 
 144. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 93, at 492 (2007) (observing that generics enter the 
market “usually within a few months of patent expiration”). This is particularly true because 
Festo’s applicability may be so straightforward that Innovator declines to bring Hatch-Waxman 
litigation against Generic. 
 146. For a discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s influence on the pharmaceutical industry, 
see supra Part I.C. 
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manufacturers preferentially attack non-AI patents,147 particularly 
formulation patents.148 Additionally, because it is often alleged that 
innovative firms increasingly adopt the so-called “evergreening” 
strategy in which they obtain additional non-AI patents on related 
products with the same active ingredients to extend market 
exclusivity after the AI patent expires, some scholars argue that PIV 
challenges, through specifically targeting and practically eliminating 
those “non-meritorious” patents, provide a mechanism to balance this 
“evergreening” strategy.149 
One possible implication of these observations is that the failure 
of innovative firms to cope with pervasive PIV challenges may not be 
a sign of the patent system’s failure to provide adequate protection. 
Rather, it may indicate that the system is working properly to exclude 
“non-meritorious” patents.150 Granted, the limitation of the doctrine 
of equivalents does not affect AI patents as much as it affects non-AI 
patents, as designing around an active ingredient can be extremely 
difficult. 
This viewpoint, however, is problematic, mainly because non-AI 
patents, although narrower in scope, do not inherently merit less 
protection than AI patents. First, products protected by non-AI 
patents, such as improved formulations or new indications, still 
require substantial R&D investment.151 A reasonable prospect of 
patent-protected market exclusivity for these products is also 
necessary to incentivize investment in their development. Second, a 
start-up drug company sometimes must rely exclusively on non-AI 
patents because the core active ingredients are unpatentable due to 
inadvertent premature disclosure.152 Although non-AI patents might 
 
 147. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 643 (“Non-AI patents have a strong positive 
relationship with challenges, especially those generating extra nominal patent term.”). 
 148. See id. at 621 (“In comparison to AI patents, patents for particular formulations—for 
example, a chemical mechanism providing sustained release of the drug substance over time—
are more open to attack.”). 
 149. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 86, at 337 (“[PIV] challenges may reflect society’s 
strongest defense against non-meritorious patents that would harm payers and patients.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Grabowski & Moe, supra note 20, at 85 (“Even after a product is approved for 
marketing, extensive R&D expenditures are frequently undertaken for new indications and 
improved formulations. Studies to establish new indications typically involve expenditures of 
well over $100 million but can be substantially greater . . . .”). 
 152. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. 
L. REV. 503, 517 (2009) (“[I]t is not uncommon for new drugs to be disclosed prematurely such 
that they cannot be patented later.”). 
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yield some hope for the developers of these products, this hope is 
much diminished because non-AI patents are vulnerable targets of 
PIV challenges.153 Indeed, pharmaceutical companies are known to 
screen out potential drug candidates for which they cannot get an AI 
patent due to unintended disclosure.154 
Finally, as also noted in the 2011 study,155 these so-called “weak” 
non-AI patents provide incremental benefit to the brand-name firms, 
and it is questionable “whether, absent the incremental protection 
provided by these weak patents, brand-name firms would have 
sufficient incentives to invest in socially valuable research.”156 Indeed, 
many important drug products rely on formulation patents or 
method-of-use patents.157 Therefore, the “just merit” of a patent—that 
is, the amount of protection the patent deserves—is more 
appropriately decided by a case-by-case analysis rather than by 
labeling it as either an AI patent or a non-AI patent. Non-AI patents 
also deserve adequate protection, which the current system does not 
afford due to the undue restriction on the doctrine of equivalents. 
In summary, the recent decline in pharmaceutical innovation 
suggests that the patent system provides inadequate financial 
incentives for innovation. At a minimum, the sharp increase in PIV 
challenges and the restrictive application of the doctrine of 
equivalents have contributed to this inadequacy. In general, patent 
protection has two independent dimensions: the time (effective 
patent life) and the scope (coverage of patent claims). In recent years, 
the effective life for drug patents has become partially dependent on 
adequate patent scope because of the popularity of PIV challenges. 
When innovative firms lose a PIV challenge for noninfringement, the 
effective life for that patent term is over with respect to at least that 
generic challenger, even if the validity and enforceability of that 
patent is still upheld. 
 
 153. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Roin, supra note 152, at 507 (“[I]t is not unusual for a pharmaceutical company to 
sour on an otherwise promising drug candidate after their attorneys turn up a prior disclosure 
that threatens its patent protection.”). 
 155. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 156. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 643. 
 157. See Grabowski & Moe, supra note 20, at 87 (“It is worth noting that many important 
drug products, such as the first AIDS therapy, AZT (zidovudine), relied on formulation or 
methods of use patents because their product patents had already expired. This could also be 
the case for many chemoprevention agents.”). 
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There are at least three possible solutions to this problem. To 
spur pharmaceutical innovation, the industry needs (1) a more 
effective parallel system to provide nonpatent protection for 
inventors, such as a significantly longer data-exclusivity period for 
brand-name drugs, (2) a less restrictive application of the doctrine of 
equivalents with an attendant broader scope for pharmaceutical 
patents, or (3) a wider application of MPF claims.158 The first 
approach requires major legislative efforts to modify current drug 
law, and the second approach requires a reversal of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the issue of the doctrine of equivalents. In 
comparison, the third approach—the application of MPF claims—is 
simply an exercise of statutorily granted claiming strategy, can be 
easily implemented, and may prove to be an efficient solution in 
certain contexts. 
III. APPLICATION OF CLAIMS WITH MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION 
CLAUSES IN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
Means-plus-function clauses for patent claims were codified in 
the 1952 Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (now § 112(f)), which provides: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a 
means or step for performing a specified function without the recital 
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall 
be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.159 
This provision consists of two parts. The first expressly 
authorizes a patent applicant to claim an element of a combination by 
its function, rather than by its structure.160 The second provides 
guidance on construction of claims including such elements.161 As 
prescribed in the statute, the literal scope of an MPF claim covers the 
“corresponding structure . . . and equivalents thereof.”162 
 
 158. MPF claims, although authorized in the 1952 Act, have not been explored much in 
pharmaceutical patents. 
 159. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). Note that the America Invents Act does not change this 
provision substantively. 
 160. See id. (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step 
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support 
thereof . . . .”). 
 161. See id. (“[S]uch claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, 
or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”). 
 162. Id. 
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Consequently, with the doctrine of equivalents not in play, the literal 
scope of a purely structural claim does not cover a product that 
contains a slight variation to the claimed structure, whereas that of an 
MPF claim does, as long as the product serves the same function and 
contains an equivalent structure as the claimed invention.163 
Therefore, the special nature of an MPF clause makes this claim 
strategy a promising solution to rectify the problem of inadequate 
claim scope by providing a broader literal claim scope. 
Although authorized by Congress sixty years ago, MPF claims 
have barely been explored in the pharmaceutical industry. The special 
nature of MPF claims, however, has generated certain interpretative 
or logical difficulties when applied in other technology fields.164 This 
Part briefly reviews the legal foundation of MPF claims, analyzes 
their potential in promoting pharmaceutical innovation, and discusses 
issues that might arise during their application. 
A. The Rationale Behind MPF Claims 
To provide more flexibility in claim drafting, Congress included 
§ 112 ¶ 6 in the 1952 Act to specifically authorize applications for 
MPF claims.165 Patent law has never strictly required nonfunctional 
language for patent claims.166 Functional language can offer 
advantages over pure structural description in certain contexts and 
has been accepted by courts long before the codification of MPF 
claims.167 
 
 163. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra note 31. 
 165. See Bradley, supra note 31, at 2 (“In response to the [Halliburton Oil Well Cementing 
Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946),] decision, Congress enacted the . . . provision, now codified as 
§ 112, paragraph 6 to authorize the use of means-plus-function clauses . . . .”); Rudolph P. 
Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, III, The Rosetta Stone for the Doctrines of Means-Plus-
Function Patent Claims, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 243 (1997) (“By far the 
most accepted reason [for the enactment of § 112(f)] is that the drafters intended to overrule the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.”). 
 166. Hofmann & Heller, supra note 165, at 245. Prior to the 1952 Act, the Supreme Court 
briefly invalidated patents written in means-plus-function format and forbade claims that “use 
‘conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty.’” Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 8–9 
(quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)). The Supreme 
Court’s objection was not to functional claim language in general, but to its particular 
application at the “point of novelty.” Id. at 8. Nonetheless, the 1952 Act specifically overrode 
Halliburton. See Patent Act, ch. 950, § 112, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2006)) (allowing for MPF claims), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). 
 167. In the case of Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1854), the Supreme Court 
examined a patent claim written with functional language and held that the claim should be 
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Both the statutory language and the legislative history of the 
1952 Act clearly indicate that § 112 ¶ 6 was enacted to provide a 
drafting option to patent prosecutors. Pasquale J. Federico, an 
Examiner-in-Chief at the USPTO who wrote the first draft of the 
1952 Act, stated that “[i]t is unquestionable that some measure of 
greater liberality in the use of functional expressions in combination 
claims is authorized.”168 Contrary to the drafter’s intention, however, 
the application of the second half of § 112 ¶ 6 has become more 
commonly sought by alleged infringers as a way to narrow claim 
scope and avoid liability in litigation since the 1990s.169 
B. The Potential for MPF Claims in Pharmaceutical Patents 
MPF claims hold great potential for pharmaceutical patents for 
several reasons. First, based on the nature of pharmaceutical patents, 
application of MPF claims was actually contemplated by the drafters 
of the 1952 Act. Second, an MPF claim can be more commensurate in 
scope with a disclosed invention than a pure structural claim, offering 
clarity and better notice to the public. Finally, wider application of 
MPF claims in pharmaceutical patents can provide a solution to the 
problem of inadequate patent scope as highlighted in Part II, which 
may in turn enable the patent system to more efficiently promote 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
First, the application of MPF claims in pharmaceutical patents 
fits the intentions of the drafters of the 1952 Act because both drug-
product claims and method-of-use claims can include at least one 
functional element. In describing the application of § 112 ¶ 6, 
Federico emphasized that one or more functional elements can be 
applied in a claim for a combination, which “may be not only a 
combination of mechanical elements, but also a combination of 
 
construed to cover the machine disclosed in the specification that performed the function, see id. 
at 269 (“The patent of Burden alleges no discovery of a new process, but only that he has 
invented a machine, and, therefore, correctly states the nature of his invention.”). The fact that 
the Court did not reject the validity of the patent claim indicated that it permitted the use of 
functional language. In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 
(1908), the Supreme Court again held that the claimed “operating means” for a particular 
functional purpose covered both the corresponding machine in the specification that achieved 
the stated purpose and the machine’s equivalents, id. at 417, 422. 
 168. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 161, 186 (1993). 
 169. See Triggs, supra note 31, at 31 (“[O]ver the last 15 years, the way courts have 
identified and treated such § 112 ¶ 6 functional claims has evolved as a way to limit the patent 
rights.”). 
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substances in a composition claim, or steps in a process claim.”170 As 
described in Part II.C, most pharmaceutical patents fall into one of 
three major categories: drug-substance patents, drug-product 
(formulation and composition) patents, and method-of-use 
(therapeutic indications) patents.171 Both drug-product claims and 
method-of-use claims are the most likely claims for combinations that 
can include one or more functional elements, especially formulation 
drug-product claims. 
Second, functional language can add accuracy and clarity to a 
patent in certain situations, providing the public with clear notice of 
the boundaries of the claim. Patent claims are statutorily required to 
be supported by a written description and be commensurate in scope 
with the enabling disclosure.172 Importantly, the language should be 
sufficiently clear to provide notice to the public regarding what has 
been claimed and what can still be freely explored.173 As the 
legislative history of the 1952 Act suggests, the special authorization 
of MPF claims was also partly motivated by the ability of those claims 
to describe an invention more precisely than structural claims.174 
Again consider the formulation claim of drug X that comprises 
three elements: active ingredients A and B, plus a carrier C that 
improves the absorption of A. Assume that the essence of the 
invention is the discovery that the inefficient absorption of A 
significantly reduces the efficacy of the drug, and that carrier C cures 
this defect through a novel mechanism. A claim element stating “a 
means for improving absorption of A” that is construed by linking the 
improved absorption to carrier C in the specification would more 
accurately capture the essence of the invention than would an 
element merely describing the structure of C. Moreover, the 
 
 170. Federico, supra note 168, at 186 (emphasis added). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
 172. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). 
 173. See id. (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing 
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or joint inventor regards as the 
invention.”). 
 174. See Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3760 Before H. Subcomm. 
No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 71 (1951) (statement of Cecil C. Kent, Esq., 
Fetherstonhaugh & Kent) (“[F]unctional form of claim . . . is the most perfect way to define a 
given structure with deductive inevitability. And it has the advantage of clearness of meaning. 
This greater clearness of meaning arises from the fact that a common, already existing 
word . . . cannot bring a definite understanding about unknown structure, and every invention 
involves some unknown or new structure naturally.”). 
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functional language clarifies to potential competitors that the patent 
covers a drug comprising A, B, and a carrier that is the structural 
equivalent to C that improves A’s absorption just as C does. 
Therefore, the functional language enables the claim to more 
precisely define the invention, providing the public with clear notice 
of the literal boundaries of what has been claimed. 
Finally, MPF claims provide a potential cure for the problem of 
inadequate scope for pharmaceutical patents. In the previous 
hypothetical, with the information provided in Innovator’s patent, 
Generic developed drug X1—the generic version of X—with the 
substitution of carrier C with C1, which is a structural equivalent to C 
and improves A’s absorption in the same manner as C. If the patent is 
limited to a composition comprising A, B, and C, Innovator likely 
cannot exclude X1 from the market due to the difficulty in proving 
infringement, particularly based on the Festo presumption of estoppel 
if Innovator’s original claim, describing carriers that encompassed 
more than C, was narrowed during prosecution to describe carrier C 
only.175 
The outcome, however, can be different if the claim is framed 
with a means-plus-function clause. Instead of claiming a composition 
comprising A, B, and C, Innovator can claim a composition 
comprising A, B, and a means for improving A’s absorption. The 
infringement analysis for X1 will not depend on the doctrine of 
equivalents because a court will likely find that X1 literally infringes 
the patent on X, as long as Innovator can establish (1) that C1 is a 
structural equivalent of C, and (2) that C1 serves the identical 
function as C.176 Thus, an easy change in claiming style can 
substantially improve the economic consequences for the Innovator. 
With structural claiming of specific elements of a formulation, 
such as the drug product, a patent may be practically useless in 
protecting Innovator’s interest. Innovator will likely lose the market 
for its drug-product formulation soon after the regulatory exclusivity 
ends. By contrast, with MPF claims, Innovator has a higher chance 
both of successfully defending a PIV challenge through asserting 
literal infringement by the challenger’s bioequivalent formulation and 
of ultimately enjoying the full statutory patent term of the 
formulation patent. Therefore, in the current industry—one in which 
pharmaceutical patents are constantly challenged by generic 
 
 175. See supra Part II.C. 
 176. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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manufacturers and patent scope of drug-product formulations can be 
unduly restricted to the literal scope of the elements recited in the 
formulation—statutorily granted MPF claims may offer more 
adequate protection to the innovators. Such protection could then 
translate into enhanced financial incentives to continue R&D 
investment in new medicine. 
C. Issues Anticipated for the Application of MPF Claims to 
Pharmaceutical Patents 
The patent system is still in search of the optimal standard for 
identifying and construing MPF claims.177 A number of issues have 
arisen during the application of § 112 ¶ 6 in other contexts.178 Similar 
issues can be anticipated when incorporating MPF claims into 
pharmaceutical patents. The potential issues fall into three categories: 
(1) when to invoke § 112 ¶ 6, (2) whether an MPF claim is infringed 
by a particular product, and (3) whether an MPF claim is patentable 
over the prior art. 
1. When Is § 112 ¶ 6 Invoked?  The USPTO has provided the 
following three-prong guideline on this threshold question: 
Examiners will apply § 112, ¶ 6 to a claim limitation that meets the 
following conditions: (1) The claim limitation uses the phrase 
“means for” or “step for” or a non-structural term that does not have 
a structural modifier; (2) the phrase “means for” or “step for” or the 
non-structural term recited in the claim is modified by functional 
language; and (3) the phrase “means for” or “step for” or the non-
structural term recited in the claim is not modified by sufficient 
structure, material, or acts for achieving the specified function.179 
 
 177. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Conflicting Theories of Equivalence: 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 in the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 40 IDEA 163, 164 (2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court and 
the Federal Circuit rely on two completely different theories when reading 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
para. 6.”); Triggs, supra note 31, at 31 (“More problematically, neither the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) nor the courts have developed a workable test to identify claims 
subject to the §112 ¶ 6 restriction, especially in a method claim.”). 
 178. See generally Bradley, supra note 31 (discussing the genesis of the equivalence standard 
under § 112 ¶ 6 and arguing that means-plus-function equivalence is no different than 
equivalence as defined in the doctrine of equivalents); Triggs, supra note 31, at 33–35 (detailing 
the numerous lines of cases in which courts have adopted different approaches to the 
application of § 112 ¶ 6 to method claims). 
 179. Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 
112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7167 (Feb. 9, 
2011). 
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This guideline establishes that the trigger for the application of 
§ 112 ¶ 6 lies in the claim language itself. A claim element is treated 
as a means-plus-function limitation if it is written in nonstructural 
terms, preferably as “means for” or as “step for,” with a functional 
statement but no structural description.180 According to the statute, 
any structural modifier181 or structural description of the element 
could potential disqualify a patent applicant from invoking § 112 
¶ 6.182 The administration of this three-prong rule should be relatively 
straightforward with composition claims but might be more difficult 
with method claims.183 
During prosecution, the patent applicant is responsible for 
making clear whether a claim limitation invokes § 112 ¶ 6; failing to 
clarify this might result in a rejection of the claim for indefiniteness.184 
When an ambiguity of this nature is found in litigation, courts are to 
decide the applicability of § 112 ¶ 6 based on the judgment of “a 
person with ordinary skill in the relevant field.”185 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. To determine whether a modifier denotes structure, 
examiners should check whether: (1) [t]he specification provides a description 
sufficient to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the term denotes structure; 
(2) general and subject matter specific dictionaries provide evidence that the term has 
achieved recognition as a noun denoting structure; and (3) the prior art provides 
evidence that the term has an art-recognized structure to perform the claimed 
function. 
Id. 
 182. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed 
as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, 
or acts in support thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011); see also Supplementary Examination 
Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues 
in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. at 7167 (“Examiners will apply § 112, ¶6 to a claim 
limitation . . . unless the non-structural term is (1) preceded by a structural modifier . . . or 
(2) modified by sufficient structure or material for achieving the claimed function.”). 
 183. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 848–49 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (Rader, J., concurring) (“[I]dentifying step-plus-function claims [is] inherently more 
problematic.”); Triggs, supra note 31, at 31 (“[N]either the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) nor the courts have developed a workable test to identify claims subject to the § 112 
para. 6 restriction, especially in a method claim.”). Method claims are inherently more difficult 
partly because it is hard to distinguish whether a step of a method is expressed as a step for 
performing a specified function without the recital of any act in support of such function. 
 184. See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 
U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. at 7167 
(“When it is unclear whether a claim limitation invokes § 112, ¶ 6 or not, a rejection under 
§ 112, ¶ 2 may be appropriate.”). 
 185. Rowe Int’l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
TANG IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2013  4:43 PM 
2013] MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION PATENT CLAUSES 1103 
2. Determining Infringement in Litigation.  Two types of 
infringement exist for any patent claim: literal infringement and 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.186 Section 112 ¶ 6 
provides a test for literal infringement, but not for infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents.187 Because the literal infringement 
analysis of MPF claims involves identification of structural 
“equivalents” of embodiments disclosed in the specification, 
confusion could result if MPF claims were subjected to an 
infringement analysis under the doctrine of equivalents. 
In an ordinary literal-infringement analysis, courts only need to 
examine whether the accused product or process contains all 
structures or acts as literally provided in the claim elements. For MPF 
claims, because the claim language describes function instead of 
structure or an act, an additional step is needed to link the structure 
or act in the specification to the function described in the claim. 
Based on the language in the 1952 Act, the Federal Circuit has held 
that an accused product or process contains the element as described 
in a means-plus-function clause if (1) it contains a structure that is 
equivalent to the structure disclosed in the specification 
corresponding to the functional limitation, and (2) the equivalent 
structure performs the same function that is stated in the claim.188 For 
example, in the previous hypothetical, if the patent for drug X claims 
a composition containing A, B, and C, which is a means for improving 
A’s absorption, then the generic drug X1 which contains A, B, and C1 
literally infringes the patent if (1) C1 is a structural equivalent of C, 
and (2) C1 performs the same function as C in promoting A’s 
absorption. 
The issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is 
logically more difficult than the issue of direct infringement, and 
commentators have disagreed about whether and how the doctrine 
should apply to MPF claims.189 In WMS Gaming, Inc. v. International 
 
 186. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (“[A] 
product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may 
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused 
product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.” (quoting Graver Tank 
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950))). 
 187. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (stating that MPF claims “shall be construed to cover the 
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents 
thereof”). 
 188. Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 189. At least three different approaches have been proposed on this issue. Some scholars 
argue that § 112 ¶ 6 only concerns literal infringement; therefore, the doctrine of equivalents 
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Game Technology,190 the Federal Circuit provided an in-depth 
analysis of this issue and held that the doctrine of equivalents does 
apply to MPF claims.191 In dealing with the difficult issue of 
“equivalents of equivalent,” the court distinguished between the 
literal scope and the equivalent scope of an MPF claim using two 
related concepts: structural equivalents and functional equivalents.192 
The court reasoned that the literal scope of an MPF claim covers 
devices containing a structural equivalent that serves the identical 
function as stated in the claim; and the doctrine of equivalents 
extends the claim to cover devices employing a structural equivalent 
that serves an equivalent, but not identical, function.193 Under this 
analysis, if carrier C1 has an equivalent, but not identical, function to 
that of C, drug X1 could infringe the patent claim on X under the 
doctrine of equivalents, but not literally. This approach is most 
consistent with the two-step infringement analysis under Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.194 In addition, it promotes 
equity and efficacy of the patent system.195 
3. Patentability Issues During Prosecution.  To procure a patent 
containing an MPF claim, the applicant first needs to convince the 
USPTO that her invention is patentable. Similar patentability issues 
might arise during litigation as well, when courts examine the 
 
should be precluded after a finding of no literal infringement. Chad S.C. Stover, Comment, 
Deciphering Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitation Infringement Under § 112, Paragraph 6: 
Finding Certainty in the Uncertain Case Law, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 101, 107 (2001). Others 
believe that “the means-plus-function clause should be accorded the scope of equivalence 
allowed by the traditional doctrine of equivalents,” basically eliminating the difference between 
literal infringement and equivalent infringement for § 112 ¶ 6 claims. See, e.g., Bradley, supra 
note 31, at 16 (noting that this interpretation “would eliminate . . . the double standard of 
equivalence”). Finally, some suggest that if a § 112 ¶ 6 claim is not literally infringed only 
because the structural equivalent in the accused device performs substantially the same—but 
not exactly the same—function as the claim provides, it may still be found to have been 
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., John N. Kandara, Note, Application of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents to Means Plus Function Claims: WMS Gaming Inc. v. International 
Game Technology, 50 DUKE L.J. 887, 905–15 (2000) (arguing, inter alia, that this interpretation 
promotes fundamental fairness). 
 190. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 191. Id. at 1353–54. 
 192. See id. at 1353 (“[A]n accused device can infringe under the doctrine of equivalents 
without infringing literally under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 because the doctrine only requires 
substantially the same function, not identicality of function as in section 112, ¶ 6.”). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). For a discussion 
of this two-step analysis, see supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text. 
 195. Kandara, supra note 189, at 889. 
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challenged patent under the same statutory criteria used by the patent 
examiner at the USPTO.196 When MPF claims were first authorized by 
the 1952 Act, Federico stated that the second part of the § 112 ¶ 6 
provision applied only in infringement analysis but not in 
patentability analysis.197 Consequently, the USPTO did not engage in 
patentability analysis of MPF claims over the prior art for more than 
forty years. In 1994, the Federal Circuit finally held that § 112 ¶ 6 
applies both to patentability examination during prosecution and to 
infringement or validity analysis during litigation in the landmark 
case In re Donaldson Co.198 Because the patentability issues during 
prosecution were not even recognized for more than forty years, and 
because MPF claims remain barely explored in pharmaceutical 
patents, some challenging issues might arise during prosecution. 
A claim can be unpatentable because of prior art if, in accord 
with its broadest reasonable construction, the claim is more 1ikely 
than not (1) anticipated by prior art,199 or (2) rendered obvious by 
prior art.200 The anticipation issue is relatively straightforward: “A 
claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the 
claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single 
prior art reference.”201 An MPF claim requires an additional inquiry 
to determine whether a functional element is present in the prior art. 
For this purpose, the USPTO has provided a three-part rule in the 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.202 Similar to the infringement 
 
 196. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2006) (detailing the criteria for patentability), amended 
by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 3(b)(1), (c), (n), 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 
285, 287, 293, 296 (2011). Significant differences, however, exist between evaluation of a claim 
during prosecution and litigation. During prosecution, the USPTO adopts the broadest 
reasonable construction of a patent application claim and must show that, more likely than not, 
the claim is not patentable. In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In 
litigation, owing to the presumption of validity of the patent, the alleged infringer is stuck with 
whatever claim construction comes out of the Markman hearing and then has the burden to 
show invalidity and/or unenforceability by clear and convincing evidence of the claim as so 
construed. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 197. Federico, supra note 168, at 186–87. 
 198. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 199. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (defining statutory novelty). 
 200. See id. § 103 (defining statutory obviousness). In general, this will be also true under 
the America Invents Act, except that the anticipatory prior art has a different definition with 
specific exceptions, and the § 103 analysis will be performed as of the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention and not at the date of invention. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(b)–
(c), 125 Stat. at 2855–78 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103). 
 201. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 202. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2183 (9th rev. 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf. 
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analysis, the functional element is found in prior art when an 
“equivalent” is identified—that is, when “the examiner finds that a 
prior art element (A) performs the function specified in the claim, (B) 
is not excluded by any explicit definition provided in the specification 
for an equivalent, and (C) is an equivalent of the means-(or step-) 
plus-function limitation.”203 
The obviousness issue for MPF claims, however, is more 
complicated and lacks regulatory guidance. Nonetheless, developing a 
test for obviousness for MPF claims requires no more than following 
the well-established standard with some consideration for the special 
nature of MPF claims. In general, an invention is unpatentable if the 
differences between it and the prior art “are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.”204 Importantly, 
one inquiry to make is “whether the improvement is more than the 
predictable use of prior-art elements according to their established 
functions.”205 Accordingly, with respect to an MPF claim, the 
threshold question in determining obviousness should be whether the 
prior-art element was known to carry the identical or equivalent 
function as provided in the claim at the time of invention. If the 
function was unknown, then the invention is nonobvious; if the 
function was known, then the inquiry should be whether it is obvious 
to those skilled in the art to combine this prior art with other 
references to arrive at the claimed invention.206 
In the previous hypothetical, assume Innovator is pursuing a 
patent application with a claim of composition comprising A, B, and 
C, which is a means to improve the absorption of A. The specification 
provides a description of C and its function in improving A’s 
absorption. Further assume that A, B, and C are all found in three 
separate prior-art references, and the question is whether the prior 
art, combined, renders the claimed invention obvious. The threshold 
inquiry should be whether C was known to improve A’s absorption at 
the time of invention.207 If not, then the invention is not obvious, and 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
 205. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 206. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 207. The America Invents Act provides that U.S. patents with claims having an effective 
filing date on or after March 16, 2013, will be generally granted to the “first-inventor-to-file.” 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(n), 125 Stat. at 293. Under the new law, the proper 
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that should be the end of the inquiry. Only when C was known for 
this function should the analysis proceed to the next question of 
whether it is obvious to a person skilled in the art to combine the 
three references. If yes, then arguably the prima facie obviousness of 
the claim is established. 
In summary, MPF claims, as authorized by the 1952 Act, have 
great potential applications in pharmaceutical patents. These claims 
can add clarity to a patent and can provide the patent with a broader 
literal scope to confer effective protection. Due to the historical lack 
of use of MPF claims in composition patents, the law is still evolving 
and a number of issues will need to be resolved in the future. 
Nonetheless, prosecutors for drug patents should consider using MPF 
claims for the reasons described here. 
CONCLUSION 
The industrial trend of cutting R&D budgets and the drying up 
of new product pipelines in innovative firms signify diminished future 
innovation, which means not only fewer life-saving drugs for the 
public but also a loss for local and national economies. From a 
broader perspective, the lack of sufficient financial incentives is by no 
means the only reason behind the shortage of pharmaceutical 
innovation. Solutions need to be found to reduce the high cost of drug 
development, and new models of R&D are needed to improve the 
efficiency of the system that frames innovation within the industry. 
Nonetheless, the patent system has traditionally played an 
indispensable role in incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation, and the 
current lack of investment suggests an inadequacy of the system that 
must be cured. 
Since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, PIV challenges 
have become pervasive and scholars have criticized their negative 
effect on innovative firms, especially in the form of shortened 
effective lives for patents.208 Many have proposed an extension of the 
regulatory-exclusivity period as a solution.209 The other dimension of 
 
inquiry will be whether C was known to improve A’s absorption at the time of the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention. See supra note 200. 
 208. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 4, at 371 (“These [PIV] challenges . . . shorten 
patent life.”); Wilson, supra note 18, at 506 (“[T]he Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 actually results in shorter effective patent terms.” (footnote omitted)). 
 209. See, e.g., Grabowski & Moe, supra note 20, at 88 (proposing “a longer exclusivity time 
for new drugs as well as biologicals”); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 192 (proposing 
“chang[ing] the five-year data exclusivity to ten years in accordance with international 
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the issue—inadequate patent scope—should not be ignored because it 
greatly exacerbates the problems created by the prevalence of PIV 
challenges. Under the current jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of 
equivalents, many patent claims are limited to their literal scope and 
are therefore easily designed around and incapable of providing 
effective protection to innovators to stimulate investment. Therefore, 
MPF claims, which can provide a more appropriate scope of 
protection under the restrictive application of the doctrine of 
equivalents, are well-placed for consideration as an efficient solution. 
 
standards”); Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process, 
355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 620 (2006) (“[A]n extended period of exclusivity should be offered 
to drug manufacturers . . . .”). 
